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FINAL EXAHI NATION
ADNIHrSTRATIVE LAH
First Semes t er 1970-1971
Hr. Powell
QUESTION I:
A suit for declaratory judgment and an injunction to nullify the action
of the Federal Aviation Administration in letting a contract for instrument
landing systems Has filed in the US District Court for the District of Columbia by Scanwell Laboratories , Inc.
The transaction involved resulted from the issuance by Federal Aviation
Administration of an invitation for bids for instrument landing systems to be
installed at airports to guide aircraft along a predetermined path to a land ing approach.
airports

Such systems are designed to make the approach of aircraft to

safer ~

a result of which the FAA sought to attain by carefully cir-

cumscribing the criteria for bids in such a 'f.:lay as to preclude bids from producers ,\'ho did not already have an operational system installed and tested in
at least one location.

To this end the invitation for bids provided :

':To be responsive to this request, the contractor shall
submit evidence that identical equipment complement as
that proposed for this procurement has previously been
installed in at least one location and has achieved at
least Category I performance as certified by an FAA
flight check

• • This shall be evidenced by the sub-

mission of a certification from the flight inspection
source. ,;
t·Jhen the bids for the instrument landing systems were opened, it l<1aS discovered that Scanwell Laboratories , Inc., \-las the second lowest bid.

The low-

est bid was entered by Airborne Instrument Laboratory , a division of Cut1erHammer, Inc.

Scam·rell Laboratories , Inc. alleged in its suit that Cut1er-

Hammer v s bid t-Jas not responsive to t he invitation for bids in that Cut1erHammer did not have a system installed in one location , nor did it have a certificate of performance based on an FAA flight check.

Scanwell Laboratories,

Inc., therefore , sought to ha.ve t he action of the FAA in ' granting the contract
to the defendant Cutler-Hammer declared nu ll and void as a violation of statutory provisions controlling government contracts and of regulations promulgated thereunder.

- 2 The Code of Federal Regulations provided :
l;To be considered for a,,yard 9 a bid must comply in all
material respects t-7ith the invitation for bids so that ,
both as to the method and timeliness of submission and
as to the substance of any resulting contracts all
bidders may stand on an equal footing and the integrity
of the formal advertising system may be maintained. I i
The Regulations go on to state

that ~

I;Any bid which fails to conform to the essential requirements of the invitation for bids 9 such as specifications, delivery schedule or permissible alternates
thereto, shall be rejected as nonresponsive. "
Scam-Tell Laboratories 9 Inc. urged that it can seek review of a contract
a\"Jard llhich is in violation of the Regulations governing the issuance thereof
by virtue of Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. also asserted that the action of the FAA in
granting this contract to an allegedly non-responsive bidder was arbitrary,
capricious and a violation of the statutory provisions governing contracting,
and that it can therefore be set aside under Section 10 (e) of the Administrative Procedure Act.
How should the court rule on the issue or issues presented and for what
reasons?
QUESTION II:
Corn Products Company and Derby Foods s Inc. petitioned the US District
Court for the District of Columbia for review on an order of the Food and Drug
Administration 9 Department of Health, Education and Uelfare, which established
a definition and standard of identity for the food product kno,,yu as peanut
butter.

They sought this reviet-T because their products , as they w'ere formu-

lated at the time of the order 9 failed to conform to the standard prescribed
by FDA.
The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 US C Section 341) contains
the follel'ling pertinent provision:
I~ Whenever

in the judgment of the Secretary such action

will promote honesty and fair dealing in the interest of
consumers , he shall promulgate regulations fixing and
establishing for any food , under its common or usual name
so far as practicable, a reasonable definition and standard of identity, a reasonable standard of quality, and/or
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reasonable standards of fill of

container ~

Provided
f ,~~ 

In prescribing a definition and standard of identity
any food or class of food in

~Jhich

optional ingredient..

are permitted, t he Secretary s hall s for the purposE.

C' -'.

promoting honesty and fair dealing in the interest of
consumers , designate the optional ingredients which

sh~ l~

be named on the label. "
The challenged order was promulgated under Section ~4 l of the F '~( :FL' :
Food > Drug and Cosmetic Ac t .

c ~'

Basically , the order limited the percentcl?':'

Height of optional ingredients uh ich migh t be added to the peanut ingred i ,?y,t
to a maximum of 10%.

It allowed for the addition or removal of peanut oi l and

limited the fat content to 55%.

The standard also identified allowable ada l -

tives and specified certain labeling requirements .
As originally

constituted~

However ~

salt s and sometimes sugar.
separation~

stickiness ~

peanut butter was composed of ground peanuts s
this product had the disadvantages of oil

short-shelf life etc.

These deficiencies had been

diminished 9 if not eliminated , by the addition of stabilizing ingredients and
hydrogenated vegetable oils.
gredient ~

Today ~

peanut butter consists of the peanut in-

which has a solid component and an oil

component ~

the stabilizer and

seasonings.
Corn Products Company and Derby
peanut butter.
ter product.

Foods ~

Inc . are the major producers of

Each has enjoyed a high degree of s4ccess with its peanut butIn 1965 Corn

Products ~

market for its brand :: Skippy. H

the industry leader , claimed 22% of the

Derby as the second leading producer had 14%

of the market from its product "Peter Pan . ,;

Their product formulations failed

to qualify under the nell standard prescribed by FDA in the challenged order
since each used in excess of 10% of optional ingredients as these are defined
by the standard . but each for a different reason .
Both petitioners

w~re

unsuccessful in urging the Food and Drug Administra-

tion to adopt a standard which would allow 13% of optional ingredients, i.e .
consist of 87% peanuts.

In their suits , Corn Products and Derby urged tha t the

adoption of the 90% standard was unreasonable and arbitrary and that the
dard would not promote honesty and fair dealing in the interest of

S l'>.::'-

consumer~ .

Corn Products also asserted that the order would result in the taking of its
property in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

In addition, the petitioners

contended that they were entitled to specific findings by FDA as to why their
products as formulated Here eliminated by the contested order.
\~at

issue or issues are presented and what scope of judicial review should

- 4 the court afford the petitioners in this case?
QUESTION III :
Samuel JacobmoTitz

j

plaintiff> a non-veteran career employe r,

than twenty-two years of government service, filed this suit fo r

; ,j"'

::" C~'~ ':) 3 ;: <' ~:r' i'lcnt

and back pay in the US District Court for the District of Columbi n.
grounds asserted in his complaint Here that his discharge from his
a GS - 9 Revenue Officer in the Internal Revenue Service

~.,as

~:1 :G0T e

','I' e
P0<;,i

j- ; ,C!,

procedurn l:!. ;

0, :~ 

as

fective and that the decision removing him Has arbitrary and capricio;Js.
The material facts ,.,ere these:
On Hay 6 , 1965, a notice of proposed adverse action v7as issued to the
plaintiff by the District Director of the Internal Revenue Service at Eackensack, NeH Jersey.
!:Charge I.

This notice contained three charges :

Gross Negligence in failing to promptly process
checks received from taxpayers in violation of
Sections 1942.52 and 142 . 60 of The Rules of Conduct for Internal Revenue Service Employees and
failure to follow the procedures in the Internal
Revenue Hanual, Part 5, concerning receipt of
remittances.

Charge II. False statements and falsification of records in
violation of Section 1942.55 of The Rules of Conduct for Internal Revenue Employees and failure
to follow the procedures in the Internal Revenue
Hanual , Part 5.
Charge III. Failure to make effective use of time and failure
to take effective collection action in performance
of official duties. 11
The plaintiff made an oral reply to these charges at an informal hearing
on July 12 ,
written

1965~

stat~ents

in

he denied all of them.

~vhich

At that time, he offered

of some persons involved in Charge II. showing that he had

in fact made the calls on the taxpayers in question and that he had not falsified the records in this connection.

He also asked for a formal hearing and

requested that all of the taxpayers be produced by subpoena at the hearing and
before any final decision

~vas

made.

The District Director advised the plaintiff, on August 26, 1965 , Hithout
any further hearing. that all of the charges and specifications thereunder
were sustained and plaintiff
tember 10, 1965.

~vas

dismissed from his position effective Sep-

Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Regional Commissioner
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of the IRS and requested a hearing.
The Regional Commissioner granted plaintiff a hearing Hhich
1965 ~

October 13,

the taxpayers as
kno~1ledge

of

before a Hearing Examiner .
~!itnesses

~vhether

at the

hearing ~

The IRS did not

nor anyone who had

'itr,,,

[l'C" ,,) ,,1 t:. ::,,,?

~Y'! d

on

pny of

a::J :'-"' ::: l- sc~.'l1

or not the plaintiff made the calls on t he

t l1';~r ?-yf': r s

stated in his reports and which the IRS contend that he did not make .

as

The only

,dtnesses of the IRS at the hearing ,,,ere its inspectors y]ho had been s ent out
to investigate the case by talking to

so~e

of the taxpayers and others long

after the calls were reported by plaintiff to have been made.

All t he inspec-

tors knew was what someone else told them about plaintiff's not having made the
calls .
The IRS introduced in evidence at the hearing the written statements the
inspectors had obtained from some of the delinquent taxpayers on uhom plaintiff
said he called , and which statements stated plaintiff had not called on them
as reported.

These statements were introduced over the objection of the plain-

tiff that they were hearsay and denied him the right to cross examination.
Plaintiff demanded the right to cross examine the absent taxpayers who made the
statements .
During the hearing before the Hearing Examiner of the Office of the Regional Commissioner . uhen it became apparent the IRS ,.,as not goin ~ to produce
the taxpayers as yJitnesses 9 the plaintiff again demanded that they be produced
and that he be given the right to cross examine them.
hearing be adjourned until this could be done.

He requested that the

The IRS objected to the pro-

duction of the taxpayers at the hearing even though they were its ,dtnesses
and relied on their statements to sustain the charges against the plaintiff.
It contended that the Examiner did not have the pmver to subpoena them , "Thich
l.;ras true.

The IRS made no shm'iing that the taxpayers had been asked to appear

as witnesses , or that it had made any effort to have them present or that the
taxpayers had refused or were unable to be present.

The plaintiff, on the

other hand , tried to produce the taxpayers but succeeded in producing only
three of the fourteen involved.
The plaintiff appeared in person at the hearing before the IRS Examiner
and testified in his own behalf.

He denied each and every specification in

Charges II and III and said they were not true.

He testified that he made

every callan the delinquent taxpayers as shown on his reports . and he introduced into evidence uritten statements of eight of the fourteen taxpayers involved which stated he had infact called on them as reported.

Three of the

taxpayers appeared in person and testified at plaintiffs request that they

- 6 told the IRS Inspectors plaintiff had called on them .

Plaintiff offered in

evidenc.e a tape recording he had n ade of his conversations Hith the remaining
three taxpayers after the charges had been filed to

sho~-1

taxpayers their admission that he had called on th(:J.'1lc

by t he

-'0 ~:_ t:::~ S

The HearLl?

of the

EXallliner

refused to admit the tape into evidence. and refused to even listen to it before he rejected it.
The plaintiff offered to testify that the charges were filed as the result
of bias and prejudice against him by his superior because he had filed two
grievance procedures against his superior previously. and had received a 90
day letter because of it .

The Examiner refused this testimony.

The plaintiff admitted the facts set forth in Charge

I~

but said it was a

frequent occurrence in IRS for checks to get misplaced temporarily and it was
not a matter of concern to anyone.

This was later confirmed by other IRS em-

ployees t]ho testified at the hearing .

The plaintiff also testified that his

group clerk should have found the checks when they were in the files .
cashing of these checks did not cause any loss to anyone.

The late

The plaintiff had

received a reprimand for this occurrence and had thought t !\e D3tter closed until
the charge '"las filed

u

At the conclusion of the hearing the IRS Hearing Examiner sustained Charge
I and Charge II but dismissed Charge III .

This became the decision of the

Regional Commissioner of Internal Revenue .
The plaintiff appealed to the
2~

and a hearing '-1as held Hay

1966.

Ne~v

York Regional Civil Service Commission

The Commission reversed the IRS

decision ~

holding that plaintiff should have been allowed to introduce the tape recording and should have been allowed to testify the charges were of a retaliatory
and

descrL~inatory

nature . and remanded the case to the IRS for a further

hearing.
Both parties appealed to the Board of Appeals and Revievl of the Civil
Service Commission.

The Board decided on September 6 $ 1966 9 that the rejection

of the tape recording and retaliatory evidence was not error and remanded the
case to the New York Regional Civil Service Commission and ordered it to adjudicate the case on its merits.
Commission on October 1

>

1966.

A further hearing was held by the Regional
Thereafter the Regional Commission sustained

Charge I and Charge II and denied plaintiffs appeal.

Plaintiff again appealed

to the Board of Appeals and r..evie't-7 ,.,yhich denied his appeal on February 14, 1967.
He then appealed to the Civil Service Commission in tvashington which denied
his appeal on June 8 , 1967.

This suit followed.

Hhat issue or issues are presented in this suit by the plaintiff seeking
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reinstatement and back pay?

HmlT should the court rule upon them and ~.vhy?

QUESTION IV :
Easton Publishing Company of Easton s Pennsylvania filed an a pplication
with the Federal Communications Commission for a license to operate a standard
broadcasting station in Easton .
casting Corporation of

AllentOlm~

At or about the same time

Allento~~

Broad-

Pennsylvania also filed an application for a

license to construct and operate a standard broadcasting station in Allentolvu.
Both stations would have to operate on the same frequency. and . despite
the fact that neither station would render service to the other community , simultaneous operation of two stations would cause mutually destructive interference.
The FCC Hearing Examiner who conducted the hearings on the two applications recommended that the Allentotvu application be granted and the Easton
application denied.

Easton filed exceptions to the recommended decision of

the Hearing Examiner with the Commission.

After oral argument the Commission

issued its final decision, rejecting the Rearing Examiners recommended decision
and granting license to Easton Publishing Co .

The Commission made detailed

findings of fact as to the qualifications of the applicants and as to the nature of the communities to be served.

Both applicants were found legally and

technically , financially and otherwise qualified to become

licensees ~

both

communities were found to be in need of programs proposed to be broadcast by
each applicant.

Easton had only one radio broadcasting station whereas Allen-

town had three .

The Commission recognized that Allentown was a city of almost

triple the size of Easton and growing at a faster pace, but FCC found that
Easton 7 s need for two stations so it would have a choice between locally originating radio programs was the determining fact.
On judicial review of the Commission's order awarding the license to
Easton . Allentown Broadcasting Co. argued that the Commission ' s reversal of
its Hearing Examiner was erroneous on the ground that the FCC did not have
authority to overrule its Examiner's findings without l1a very substantial preponderence of the testimony as recorded to the contrary" and that the Examiner's
findings could be overruled by FCC only ltlhen they were itclearly erroneous. II
vlhat disposition should the reviewing court make of this contention of
Allentown Broadcasting Co., and for tvhat reasons?

QUESTION V:
The National Enforcement Commission served simultaneous administrative
notices on Grand Central Aircraft Co . and on Jonco Aircraft Corporation charging
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each of them with violations of the Wage Stabilization provisions of the Defense Production Act of

1950 ~

and scheduling hearings thereon.

Grand Central

and Jonco were two small business corporations manufacturing aircraft parts.
In that posture of the administrative proceedings, the tlvO aircraft manufacturers filed separate suits in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia to enjoin further administrative action and hearings on
these charges by the Commission to determine their guilt of the violations
asserted~

until after these suits had been heard and adjudicated on the merits

by the Court.
1.

In their respective suits the aircraft manufacturers

alleged ~

The conduct of the proposed administrative hearings
would cause irreparable damage by cutting off their
bank credit and depriving them of essential vlOrking
capital.

2.

The Defense Production Act of 1950 did not authorize
the National Enforcement Commission to institute such
administrative proceedings for the enforcement of the
{>lage Stabilization provisions.

The District Court consolidated the two cases for hearing since the issues
.'involved ~vere identical.
In their respective verified complaints the t,vo Aircraft companies alleged
that the administrative proceeding itself would cause irreparable injury by
cutting off their bank credit. thereby depriving them of essential tvorking
capital ~

regardless of the outcome on judicial

proceeding . because :

revie~"

of the administrative

(1) If the National Enforcement Commission should find

a violation it would certify to all government agencies including the Internal
Revenue Tax Service for income tax purposes , the disallowance of all illegal
wage payments found by it to have been made, which would disqualify such

l~age

payments as a business expense for income tax purposes, thereby so substantially
increasing the Companysi income tax liability as to render them insolvent.

The

alleged amount of excess wage payments involved was $5,000,000 for one of the
companies and $7 . 500 . 000 for the other company.

(2) The Banks involved l.Jould

be allerted to this possibility by the holding of the Commission hearings and
t-lOuld immediately call their loans and refuse additional vlorking capital loans
to these two ComFanies

~lhich

would result in their insolvency and termination

of their operations.
Counsel for the National Enforcement Commission filed a motion to dismiss
these complaints, thereby admitting for purposes of the motion the truth of all
of the factual allegations contained in the complaints.
HOv1 should the Court rule upon the motions to dismiss and for what reasons?
F.Nn

